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Void Between Empiricism & Knowledge

Void Between Empiricism & Knowledge

Why sensation is not an epistemology

Empiricism walks up to the Knowledge Club door holding one chip. Sensation. A color. A pressure. A sound. That is the whole stake. Not revelation added later when the argument gets lonely. Not logic smuggled in as a house rule. If the starting point is sensation, the starting point is sensation. Think about that for three seconds. If sensation is the starting point, then that is all the starting point is. Anything that shows up in the conclusion and was not in that chip is a void. Not a hunch. Not “it feels solid.” A missing license.

A newcomer can get lost in the word epistemology. Forget the word for a second. A starting point for knowledge has one job. It has to license the first claim. A claim, here, is a sentence that can be true or false. “This is a mountain.” “The cup is on the table.” “I am sensing.” Those have a thing, and something said about the thing. A color event does not. It happens. The ticket booth at the door wants a sentence for the ticket to be valid. The chip is a patch of gray. Already the transaction looks funny. The booth attendant holds it up: “Where’s the sentence? This happens. It doesn’t say anything.”

People hear this and reach for the lights coming on, the cup where the hand expected, the plane that landed. Those are great stories about feelings of confidence. They are not evidence. A long streak of confident feelings is still a streak of feelings. Confidence and feelings are not subjects and predicates; they are not invisible premises of true or false. The question is whether the sensation contains the conclusion. It does not. The logical voids are still there. I will be using “logical void” and “hole” as the same.

Logical Void One: a sensation cannot justify a sensation

Vincent Cheung puts the knife in with a plain question (Sermonettes, Vol. 1: Questions for Empiricists), the kind a newcomer can ask without a philosophy degree. If information comes from sensation, how do you know you are having a sensation? Do you sense the sensation? Then do you sense the sensation that senses the sensation? If the answer is always another sensation, the stack never lands. This is a true definition of being circular or begging the question. You are looking for the bottom of a pile of mirrors and calling it a foundation. Cute. If the answer is not another sensation, you have already left the foundation of empiricism to certify empiricism with a different foundation. You stepped outside the sensation to stamp the sensation as valid. When this is done, sensation is no longer a starting point.

Try it in the kitchen. The light is on. You want to know that you are seeing the light. If seeing is the only way to know, then you need a seeing of the seeing. Then a seeing of that. The light itself never said, “You are seeing me.” That sentence was extra. You do not even get to name the method. “Sensation” is a word. A word is not a color. Naming the method was a non-sensation doing the work the sensation was supposed to do.

The absence is worse, and this is the part that gets ridiculous. Do you ever not have a sensation? How do you know that? A lack of sensation is not a sensation. The report “I am not sensing that” is a non-sensation licensing a claim about sensation. You cannot sense “not doctored,” “not an atom,” “not a second moon,” or “I do not know this.” There is no color of absence. There is no pressure shaped like “not.” The moment you know an absence, is the moment sensation stopped being foundation.

That is begging the question in the strict sense. Not the loose sense of “I don’t like your tone.” The thing to be proved — that sensation can justify — is assumed in the attempt, or dropped the moment the proof needs a non-sensation. Sensation cannot pay for its own admission. It cannot pay for the sentence “this is a sensation.” A start has one job: make knowledge possible. This one cannot even introduce itself. The chip looks for the bottom of a pile of mirrors and still gets bounced at the window.

Calling the sensation patch “data” is the same loan, taken out early, with a nicer font. Data means something that counts, that differs from noise, that can be read. A color event does not contain “this is data or information.” The word already imported intelligibility, difference, and “this one counts.” The patch never issued those. If you need a non-sensation to know that you are sensing, the sensing was never the start.

Logical Void Two: the categories are not in the patch

Suppose, for the sake of argument, the first hole is ignored and a patch is simply had. Be generous. Hand the empiricist the gray slope and do not ask how he knows he has it. Knowledge still does not start. Knowledge is a premise that can be true or false. A subject, a predicate, a copula. “This is a mountain.” A sensation is an event. Events are not true or false. They happen. Rain happens. A sentence about rain can be wrong or true. Knowledge about the event is not the event itself. Not the same categories. The sentence is invisible. The look is not invisible. One is incorporeal, the other is corporeal. One is non-data, the other is data. One has meaning and the other has no meaning.

The gray slope in the eyes is not the mountain. This is the copy problem, and it is not a trick. What you have is the sensation; a momentary transient non-data patch. The mountain, if there is one, is a different item. Sameness between picture and object is a relation. No shade of gray is that relation. Dream-slope and valley-slope can wear the same colors. A heat haze can wear them too. Nothing in the colors stamps one of them “real” and the other “nice try.” If the patch is all you have, the patch does not tell you which world you are in. The booth wants a sentence that can be true or false. Your gray patch is just an event. Rain happens. “This is rain” is a different category the chip never issued.

Two slopes in a row are not “the same mountain.” Blink. A cloud passes. New shade of gray. Each moment is a new event. Nothing in the new event is stamped “still the mountain from five seconds ago.” That is not data; an event is not data. That is meaning; sensation is not meaning. Continuity is added. You brought the idea of one persistent thing. The colors did not sell it to you. Slope, then moving leaves, is not “the wind caused it.” You got order. You did not get production. The “makes it happen” is not a color and not a sound. Ball touches ball, second ball rolls. The push-power is not in the picture. One is not knowledge, the other is. One has no meaning, the other does.

This slope is not “mountain” as a kind, and not “all mountains.” One occurrence does not contain the unseen cases. A universal is not a very large particular. No pile of patches, however tall, contains the “all.” Some is not all. Grace is not works, and works are not grace. And the slope is not the law that a thing is what it is, or that it cannot both be and not be a mountain. Turn the light off and the colors go. Those relations do not go with them. They were never in the patch. Cheung’s question lands here too. How did you sense the law of contradiction? If you used it to keep sensations from being nonsense before you “learned” it, it was not learned from them. You were already using it to keep the patch from meaning everything at once.

So the order is this, and a newcomer can keep it on a napkin. First the standard fails on its own ground. Sensation cannot justify a sensation, and cannot justify the lack of one, without a non-sensation. Then, even granting the non-data patch, identity, difference, cause, motion, sameness over time, and a subject and predicate that can be true or false are different categories not in the non-data patch. They have to come out of the “sensation gave me this” column before a knowledge claim is possible. After both removals, what remains is a non-data patch. A patch is not a premise. Without a premise there is no knowledge, only an event somebody later narrates with tools the event did not contain. No ticket. No entry.

“Reliable enough” is not a middle

The soft exit sounds modest, which is how a lot of fake tickets get past the ticket booth. Sensation does not have to be certain. It is reliable enough. It predicts. The cup is where the sensation said it was. So it gives knowledge, or close enough that mentioning the difference is rude. Handing over a sticky note that says “usually works” is not a valid ticket.

Modest is not a license. If the senses are less than infallible, you need a standard that cannot fail, to judge each instance. You cannot know by sensation which sensation is the correct one, or how reliable this one is. A mirage is a perfectly ordinary visual event. A stick in water looks bent, and the bent look is a perfectly ordinary visual event. “Usually right” is a story about other days. It does not label today. The non-data haze does not come with a flag that gives the data “this is one of the bad ones.”

Cheung’s line is the sharp one, and it is worth hearing slowly. Even if seeing a mirage is “properly basic,” it is properly useless unless you can know by sensation that it is a mirage. Properly basic reliability is not enough. The empiricist needs properly basic infallibility. He does not have the weaker thing either, because he cannot know by the sensation how reliable the non-data patch is.

Any degree of dependence on empiricism on that issue drops you into agnosticism about it. Not a softer knowledge. A blank. If a non-sensory standard stamps this instance “good,” then you accepted this new non-sensation standard as your new starting point. You did not accept the sensation as the source. There is no humble middle. Either the standard can fail, and you do not know whether this case is a hit, or it cannot fail, and the infallible item is doing the knowing. The booth does not do soft exits. Your percentage is a confident feeling wearing a number, hoping no one asks to see the receipt.

The twin question is just as empty, and newcomers skip it. How do you know that you do not know? A miss is not labeled inside the non-data patch. The same sensation that cannot certify a hit cannot certify a miss. A percentage you cannot audit is not knowledge with the edges sanded off.

For knowledge to be possible, you need to know what is true or false. If the standard does not give an infallible way to know what is true or false, then you don’t know what is true or false, and you fall into an agnosticism and skepticism that denies the law of contradiction. Some might argue with rhetoric like, “Only true or hard skepticism is a denial of the law of contradiction.” This is misleading. If the topic is your starting point of knowledge, then without the infallible standard it is skepticism and skepticism denies the law of contradiction. When knowledge never starts, you don’t have it. The starting point is not a small side issue about knowledge; it is the issue. If knowledge never started, then you don’t have the knowledge to say you have knowledge, and you don’t have the knowledge to say that you don’t have knowledge. Those are violations of identity and contradiction.

The fraction that was never finished

In Paul and the Philosophers, Cheung catches the rescue in the act. A theory that cannot be proved true gets called “probably true.” Sounds humble. Sounds numerical. Probability is a fraction. Favorable cases on top. All possible cases on the bottom. You must know both. Before you have knowledge you cannot know the denominator, the complete set of relevant possibilities. Without it you cannot calculate a probability at all. To have the denominator you would already need the knowledge the experiment was supposed to deliver, and you would have no need for the experiment.

Picture a chicken coop you have never seen. And Johnny says to you this afternoon, “I picked up six eggs this morning, therefore I have half of the eggs for today.” Half of what? If you do not know how many eggs there are, “six” is not a fraction. It is a story about six. Observation gives you the hits you happened to have. It does not give you every way the thing can go, including the failures you have not met, including the cases nobody has sensed. Particulars do not contain the “all.” That is the same logical void as “this slope is not all mountains,” wearing a lab coat. Probability without the full coop is like waving a half-stamped chip and saying “probably good enough for the VIP section.” Booth: “Show me the denominator or get out. Felt confidence isn’t a ticket.”

What people actually have is a feeling of confidence, or a pattern their minds have supposedly recognized, dressed in the language of numbers. Cheung’s line is the one to keep. Probability without a true denominator is psychology disguised as epistemology. A feeling that the next slice will be there is not the fraction.

Inside a closed toy — a die you have defined as six faces — someone can divide hits by the faces they stipulated. That is arithmetic inside an assumed box. Useful for board games. It is not a probability that corresponds to reality, and it is not a measurement of how reliable sensation is. The real denominator would include every unseen case and every way the non-data patch can fail. Observation never delivers that set. So no one has completed the reliability fraction. “Decently reliable” was never calculated. It was felt, then named. The badge was never issued.

If it is not the start, it is not the epistemology

Put the logical voids next to sensation and the starting-point claim collapses in plain sight. A starting point has to pay for the first claim. This one cannot pay for its own admission, cannot pay for the categories inside the claim, and cannot pay for the stamp that says this instance is one of the good ones. That is not an epistemology. An epistemology is an account of how you know. An account that cannot license a single premise is a mood of confident feelings; what it is not, is knowledge about anything.

Confident emotions are why people still talk this way. The cup was where the hand expected. The emotion of success got promoted into a theory of knowledge. When the claim on the table is “this is how knowing starts,” the streak is irrelevant. Success at finding the cup is not a proof that the patch contained “cup,” “same cup,” and “true.”

“Part of the process” is a retreat, and it should be treated as one. Even if that concession is granted — that sensation is part of the process — part of the process is not the same as the start. The start is whatever licenses the first premise. If sensation is not that, empiricism is not the theory of knowledge. Sensation is, at most, an occasion somebody else has to interpret with knowledge, meaning, logic, and tools sensation cannot supply. The later steps inherit the bankruptcy. They do not cure it.

The dismissal makes sense only if the attack is heard as “you do not have eyes.” That is not the attack. Eyes are not an epistemology. If someone offers sensation as the starting point, it deserves the question any starting point deserves. Does this actually give knowledge? Is it possible? Looking at the non-data sensation, no. There is no route from the event to the premise that does not spend money the event never had.

They already attacked a starting point

Here is the part that gets called weird, and it is the most ordinary move in the room. A scientist says the earth cannot be that young, so if the Bible says otherwise you should not believe the Bible. That is an attack on a starting point. Reliance on the text, they say, means you do not have knowledge. They treated your start as an epistemology and checked its ticket. Fine. That is allowed. In fact, as Christians we prefer to take the debate to the starting point level. If they attack our start, we are allowed to attack their start.

Science, if it claims knowledge, has a starting point too. Whatever it does later — instruments, models, long runs, very serious faces — it still has to get a premise from observation. Observation is sensation. If sensation never issued a premise, the later steps have nothing to inherit. Length of experiment does not mint a denominator the start never had. A hundred trials are a hundred patches. A thousand are a thousand patches. None of them is “all possible outcomes,” and none of them is “this premise is true.” Doing a bankrupt thing for a long time does not make it solvent. They checked the Bible ticket and said no knowledge. Cool. Now the sensation chip gets the same check at the same booth. Long runs of patches don’t mint a premise. Plane lands — utility is great. Knowledge is different. They crossed the line first.

Attacking sensation is not a dodge around the lab. It is the parallel question. They asked whether a claimed start, in our case the Bible, gives knowledge. Sensation is the start they have to defend. Showing that it does not give knowledge is the same kind of check.

Utility can stay on the table. This is the distinction that keeps the argument honest. The plane can land. The bulb can come on. Pragmatic utility is great and we use it; but it is not knowledge. Something can be pragmatically repeatable and still be a false claim against reality; thus it is not knowledge. The cup can be where the hand expected. Pragmatic success is a different claim from knowledge. They are the ones who crossed that line, when they said reliance on the Bible means you do not know. Turning around and checking their necessary start is not unjust, and it is not a change of subject. It is the ticket check they already ran on us, but now pointed at their own.

If sensation is not the starting point, then knowledge never starts for the scientist. If knowledge never started, then there is no knowledge for any point for the scientist. The booth stays closed. Meanwhile, God’s revelation doesn’t need a chip; He stamps the ticket Himself and opens the door. Only the Bible ticket clears it, because the God who issues it causes the mind to know it. Everything else is a void, a missing license, a bankrupt chip.

Paul Confronts the Genetic Code: The Preconditions of Intelligibility

I’m drawing these specific presuppositional arguments from Vincent Cheung’s “Presuppositional Confrontations,” “Captive to Reason,” “Ultimate Questions,” and especially “Paul and the Philosophers.” Full credit to him—he’s the one who helped me hone these tools. The opening pages of “Paul and the Philosophers” are gold: a clear, devastating summary of how Paul did apologetics. Go read them

Acts 17 records that while Paul waited in Athens, “his spirit was provoked within him when he saw that the city was given over to idols” (v. 16). The apostle didn’t stroll through the marketplace nodding at the philosophers’ cleverness or hunting for common ground in their latest metaphysical fashion. He confronted them with the revelation of the true God who “made the world and everything in it” and who “gives to all life, breath, and all things” (vv. 24-25). In “Paul and the Philosophers”, Vincent Cheung expounds this encounter as the biblical model for apologetics: “Challenge, Confrontation, and Conquest.”

The philosophers of Athens—Epicureans and Stoics—operated from presuppositions that could not sustain the most basic conditions of thought and experience. The same pattern repeats in every age, including ours. Some things never change—except when materialists try to make them change without a Cause.

Consider the video “Origin of the Genetic Code: What We Do and Do Not Know,” produced by the “Stated Casually” channel with Stephen Woodford. The presenters note that the genetic code functions as a genuine symbolic system (we’ll grant they are codes and a symbolic system for the sake of argument. This means we’re pretending here, because that’s what “for the sake of argument” means). That is, a language with codons as symbols, amino acids as referents, syntax, redundancy, and error-correcting mechanisms. They invoke signaling theory, co-evolution, RNA-world hypotheses, and probabilistic arguments to claim this code arose through mindless natural processes. They admit “vast unknowns” yet insist evolution suffices. But this is skepticism—and skepticism denies the law of contradiction. We’ll move on anyway.

In doing so they stand exactly where the Athenian philosophers stood: using the language of intelligibility while denying the only foundation that makes such language possible. One almost admires the gall—until one realizes they’re trying to get blood from a philosophical stone… or rather, intelligible code from a universe that’s philosophically non-intelligible code.  LOL. Such a position is to be mocked and dismissed.

Non-Christian presuppositions are in rebellion against God and therefore distort and suppress the truth (Romans 1:18-20). The video’s materialist narrative cannot account for the preconditions of intelligibility it constantly employs. Materialism and empiricism are inherently circular: they use every point of intelligibility to construct their arguments, then attempt to “prove” those same points from within a system that cannot justify them. That’s wall-punching hilarious. Their premises always smuggle extra unproven information into the conclusion to make the intelligibility conditions appear to emerge from matter alone. They have no justification for using them. Let us press the matter point by point—because nothing says “I love philosophy” like watching someone saw off the branch they’re sitting on while claiming the branch grew itself.

When intelligibility is defined by materialism, atheism, observation, or empiricism alone, the result is not neutral inquiry but a closed loop that devours its own justification. The secular thinker must presuppose the very rational order, categories, the 3 laws of logic, and knowledge he denies in order to deny it. This is not a minor flaw—it is epistemic suicide. It’s like trying to debug the C++ while denying the laws of C++. Bold move.

Cause. Every effect requires a sufficient cause. If the genetic code is an ordered, functional system of information, then it is an effect. The video traces its “origin” through gene duplication, peptide-RNA interactions, and selection pressures, yet this merely pushes the problem backward. What is the real cause? As Vincent Cheung points out in Paul and the Philosophers, the Epicureans appealed to chance collisions of atoms; the Stoics appealed to an impersonal logos. Neither could explain why causation exists or why causes are orderly rather than chaotic. Only the biblical worldview answers: the self-existent Creator who upholds all things by the word of His power (Hebrews 1:3).

The materialist uses cause at every step of his evolutionary narrative, then tries to prove that cause itself arises from blind matter. This is circular. He must already assume causal regularity (the very thing in question) to interpret his observations, then adds unproven information—that matter alone can produce ordered causation—into his conclusion. He has no justification on materialist premises for doing so. It’s like trying to lift yourself by your own bootstraps, except the bootstraps are made of unproven assumptions, the boots are on fire, and the fire was started by a random chemical reaction that somehow “knew” it needed to be dramatic.

Identity. Since the law of Identity relates to categories, we’re dealing with categories. A thing must be itself and not something else. The genetic code must maintain stable identities: adenine pairs with thymine, specific codons specify specific amino acids, the standard code persists across vast domains of life. The video discusses minor variations yet treats the code as a stable identity that “evolved once.” On materialist premises, why should any pattern remain identical across replications or generations? Without justification for Identity, the materialist cannot intelligently say that identity “x” stayed identity “x” while identity “y” became identity “q.” Why shouldn’t flux and contradiction reign in a world where chaos is the foundation? Only the immutable God—“I am the Lord, I do not change” (Malachi 3:6)—grounds identity. The Bible teaches that grace is grace and works are works, and grace is not works and works is not grace.

The materialist uses identity throughout his account, then attempts to prove that stable identities emerge from matter in motion. This is circular. He presupposes the very stability he claims to explain, smuggling extra information into his conclusion that matter can sustain sameness over time. He has no justification for this move within his own system.

“Some may argue that categories are learned from repetition. They think that a person hears the word ‘cause’ whenever one event follows another, so eventually the mind learns the concept of cause from repeated patterns. This fails. To recognize a pattern already requires categories like identity through time and rules for connecting one case with another. Without those categories, the person would have nothing to tell him that the same kind of event has happened again, rather than just a meaningless string of flashes. Even the claim that a concept is ‘learned’ from many examples uses the very concept during the learning process.

This means that meaning itself requires fixed rational structure that is prior to and independent of any particular observation. Prior does not mean earlier in time… It means logically prior. If reason is to be reason, it must stand on something that does not depend on shifting feelings or human customs. This foundation must be universal… necessary… and rational in itself… If such a foundation exists, then human thought has an anchor… Without it, thought reduces to meaningless sounds with no right to claim belief.” 

 — Vincent Cheung, Paul and the Philosophers, p. 4

Probability and the numerator-denominator problem. The presenters repeatedly appeal to probability: the “likelihood” of functional proteins, the “probability” of certain codon assignments, the unlikelihood of design. Yet as Vincent Cheung reminds us, probability consists of a numerator (specific observations) and a denominator (the complete set of all relevant possibilities—the universal framework). Empiricism and induction can never know the denominator unless they are all-knowing. But if you’re all-knowing, you don’t need science or experiments—you already have knowledge. The act of science or experimentation is an admission you don’t have knowledge. Science is not knowledge. Science, by its own materialist, empiricist, observational method, makes knowledge impossible. It lies beyond any finite set of observations.

To claim the genetic code’s origin is “probable” under naturalism, one must already possess knowledge of the total range of possibilities—an omniscience the materialist does not have. The appeal to probability is therefore circular: the unbeliever uses the numerator while smuggling in an unjustified denominator. He adds extra unproven information into his conclusion—that a stable universal order exists from which probabilities can be calculated—while denying the only source of that order. He has no justification for the denominator on empiricist terms.

“Before you have knowledge, you cannot possibly know the denominator, the complete set of relevant possibilities. But without the denominator, you cannot calculate a probability at all. To establish the denominator, you would need knowledge larger than the present context, in fact, knowledge of the entire range of possible outcomes. At that point you would already have the very knowledge probability is supposed to deliver, and you would have no need for the experiment or the appeal to probability in the first place.

In practice, when people appeal to probability in this way, they are never doing real probability. What they describe is a sense of confidence, an intuition shaped by repetition or prejudice, or a pattern their minds have supposedly recognized. Then they dress this feeling in the language of numbers. But a feeling of confidence is not knowledge, and pattern recognition is not proof, especially when the pattern was derived from a defective framework. Probability without a true denominator is psychology disguised as epistemology.

 Probability cannot serve as a path to truth. If you lack knowledge, you cannot establish the denominator, so probability cannot be applied. If you somehow knew the denominator, you would already possess knowledge far greater than the experiment offers, which makes the experiment irrelevant. In either case, probability does not solve the problem of knowledge. It assumes what it must prove.” 
 — Vincent Cheung, Paul and the Philosophers, p. 6

Difference and distinction. Intelligible thought requires real distinctions. Codons must differ from one another; start codons must differ from stop codons; the genetic code must differ from other biological signaling systems, or there is no intelligibility. Without grounded distinctions, language itself becomes impossible. The Athenian philosophers could not consistently maintain distinctions because their ultimate principles blurred all categories into flux or unity. The biblical doctrine of creation establishes real differences: God made the beasts “according to their kinds” (Genesis 1:25).

The materialist uses distinctions at every turn in his analysis, then tries to prove that real differences arise from undifferentiated matter. And yet again, this is circular. He presupposes the distinctions he claims to explain, adding unproven information into his conclusion that matter can generate and maintain genuine difference. He has no justification within materialism for doing so. Matter apparently has a very strong opinion about what counts as “different”—until it doesn’t. (LOL.)

Time and history. The video narrates a story of the code “emerging” over deep time through gradual processes. But time itself requires grounding. Why does time flow in one direction? Why is there a past, present, and future rather than eternal stasis or chaos? The philosophers of Athens offered cyclical or eternal views of time that could never ground genuine history. Scripture reveals time as the created arena where God consistently makes reality act in regular ways for His purpose.

The materialist uses time and temporal sequence throughout his narrative, then attempts to prove that time and history themselves emerge from matter. This is circular. He presupposes the temporal order he claims to explain, smuggling extra information into his conclusion that matter can produce directed, meaningful history. He has no justification on his own premises.

Motion—the ball in flight. Even the simplest act of perception exposes the problem.

“When the mind looks at a scene, it does more than take a mental picture. It interprets the scene using concepts such as identity, difference, number, relation, time, and cause. These concepts are not pulled from the scene itself. When a child looks at two apples, he uses the concept of number to know that they are two. When he follows a ball flying through the air, he uses time and continuity to track its motion. When he says that the ball broke the window, he uses the concept of cause. If he had to first create number, time, or cause from raw sensory data before using them, he could never begin to use them at all. Any attempt to ‘get’ them from experience would already need them to be in use. Interpretation comes with built-in categories that experience does not provide. This concerns the necessity of innate structure. Certain categories must exist for observation to have any meaning at all.” 

 — Vincent Cheung, *Paul and the Philosophers*

As Cheung shows, this simple act presupposes the intelligibility conditions that empiricism claims to derive from sensation. The materialist uses motion and continuity at every step of his evolutionary story, then tries to prove that ordered motion arises from matter alone. This is circular. He presupposes the very motion and regularity he claims to explain, adding unproven information into his conclusion that blind matter can sustain directed, continuous change. He has no justification within his system for this assumption.

Language and meaning. The video correctly identifies the genetic code as language. But language presupposes a mind—a speaker who intends meaning. Without an intelligent source, symbols collapse into mere physical motion of particles. Non-Christian worldviews cannot account for meaning. The materialist uses meaningful language and symbolic analysis throughout his presentation, then attempts to prove that meaningful language and symbols arise from matter without mind. This is circular. He presupposes the meaning and intentionality he claims to explain, smuggling extra unproven information into his conclusion that chemistry alone can produce genuine communication. He has no justification on materialist terms for treating meaningless matter as meaningful.

Science isn’t knowledge, because it’s anti-logic with a PhD. Science is without logic, and so it is just expensive storytelling in a lab coat.

These are not peripheral issues. They are the fatal flaws that render the entire video incoherent on its own terms. The presenters employ cause, identity, probability, difference, time, motion, language, and meaning at every turn; precisely the preconditions of intelligibility that only Christian revelation can justify. They use these tools to “prove” a naturalistic origin for the genetic code, yet they have no justification for the tools themselves. Their method is circular by necessity, because their first principle—random matter in motion without God—cannot produce or sustain rationality, intelligibility, order, or information. They borrow the Christian doctrines of providence, uniformity, and meaning while denying the Provider, always adding extra unproven information into their conclusions to make the intelligibility conditions appear to emerge from matter alone.

If the genetic code is indeed code, then it testifies against them. The video’s story is a modern retelling of the Athenian idols: sophisticated in appearance, but built on sand. Paul did not flatter the philosophers or accommodate their categories. He declared the Creator, exposed their ignorance of the “unknown god,” and called them to repent because God “has appointed a day on which He will judge the world in righteousness by the Man whom He has ordained” (Acts 17:31).

To the makers of the video and all who share their presuppositions: your system cannot account for the intelligibility you employ in every sentence. You speak of cause, identity, probability, difference, time, motion, language, and meaning while standing on foundations your worldview has sawed off. You use these points to construct your argument, then circularly attempt to prove them from within materialism and empiricism—always smuggling extra unproven information into your conclusions—yet you have no justification for doing so. Repent. The same revelation that explains the intelligibility for all codes explains your need for a Savior.

Chance denies order yet relies on order to articulate the theory. Necessity cancels rational judgment yet uses rational judgment to defend it. Both erase the preconditions of meaningful time, logic, categories, intelligibility, morals, and knowledge.

God is the only response that does justice to the supposed genetic code and all other codes. All other explanations are variations on the idols of Athens—old and new. The truth remains: the God who made the genetic code has spoken, and His Word is the precondition of every word we speak, every code we decode, and every argument we advance. To Him be the glory forever. Amen.

The Scientific Process

After my own studies and discussions with Grok xAI, I’ll outline a step-by-step breakdown of modern science. Some still believe science is rational, deductive, and logical. We’ll dissect the process and reveal it’s anti-logical from start to finish, despite using modus tollens.

Karl Popper exposed the anti-logical nature of scientific experimentation, particularly the nonsense of affirming the consequent. To counter induction’s irrationality and this fallacy, Popper proposed scientists use modus tollens to invalidate hypotheses. Modus tollens is a valid deductive form. Yet, if you lack upfront truth, affirming the consequent is the only way to positively affirm a claim, if the logic is to correctly correspond to your actions. Popper aimed to minimize this by favoring deduction. The catch? At best, modus tollens can say something is wrong—it can’t confirm truth. Today, top scientists recognize induction and science’s irrationality, leaning into falsification for better experiments.

If we admit science offers no truth, only pragmatic usefulness, then adding modus tollens at the end enhances practical outcomes. We support this. As noted, science fulfils God’s command to dominate the world for practical benefits—a blessing He ordained. But that’s all science is. Even when its utility seems impressive, its statements about reality are false.

Since the scientific process is rooted in inductive and observational fallacies, it’s irrational and anti-logic. Slapping modus tollens on the end doesn’t erase this irrationality; it just improves pragmatic results. It’s right to acknowledge science’s baked-in anti-logic and compensate with deduction—if we clarify this is for usefulness, not knowledge.

Before detailing the process, let’s define falsification. Grok xAI (2024) put it this way:
“The origin of falsification, per Popper, is rooted in the idea that a hypothesis must be scientific if an experiment or observation could prove it false. This was a direct jab at the inductivists and verificationists of his time. Popper’s philosophy was like saying, ‘Science isn’t about piling up evidence for your theory; it’s about daring it to fail.’”
This is accurate but needs unpacking to avoid confusion. Popper critiqued scientific experimentation (i.e., “verification”) that relied wholly on affirming the consequent to link hypotheses to reality.”

Grok calls it a “jab at inductivists,” which can mislead. Even with modus tollens, science remains overwhelmingly inductive. Though Popper shifted “verification” to the “pre-hypothesis” stage rather than the endpoint, falsification swims in a sea of inductive reasoning and observation. Grok was correct that “Popper would have it… it must be possible to conceive of an experiment or observation that could prove it false.” Popper’s falsification operates within “inductive observation” and “inductive experiment.”

Thus, despite jabbing inductivists, Popper’s method still employs induction. Science isn’t one thing—it’s a process. I once heard a scientist claim, “Science is only deductive because it’s only about falsification, specifically modus tollens.” This misrepresents Popper’s approach, which integrates induction and observation. When I asked Grok (2024), it responded, “Absolutely not! Popper argued a theory must be falsifiable, aligning with modus tollens’ deductive logic to disprove it. But induction isn’t sidelined:

  • Initial Phase: Science starts with observation and inductive reasoning to form hypotheses.
  • Ongoing Nature: As hypotheses are tested, scientists refine them with new observations and inductive leaps, keeping induction central.”
    Since falsification uses induction, it’s inherently irrational, violating the laws of identity and contradiction. It’s a systematic affirmation of false premises in unsound arguments, pretending to deny something.

Calling “science deductive” is false. I wouldn’t even say it’s inductive and deductive—its “deduction” is unsound. I wouldn’t label an unsound argument deductive unless we’re pretending in a fantasy world. Generously, we could call science heavily inductive with some deduction tacked on.

This matters for Christians. The Bible uses only sound arguments, rejects induction’s anti-logic, and shows our observations can be wrong. It dismisses empirical observation and induction for knowledge. Thus, falsification isn’t a biblical standard and can’t yield knowledge. Some fools hybridize this irrational human method with the Bible’s rational approach, claiming falsification aids understanding Scripture and truth. This is blasphemy—melding the irrational with God’s rational system defames His mind as irrational or endorsing irrationality. Similarly, fake presuppositionalists claim the Bible ratifies observation and empiricism for knowledge—nonsense.

Another reason to reject falsification: its maxim—“something must be provably wrong to have credibility”—is false. The law of contradiction (LoC) isn’t falsifiable; denying it requires using it. Self-authenticating truths, like the LoC, render falsification inapplicable. At best, falsification fits inductive observations. The Bible, as shown in epistemology, is self-authenticating—unfalsifiable. It can’t be proven wrong because any attempt presupposes it; Scripture declares itself true and all else false. We don’t use falsification to read the Bible or find truth. If it’s such a great rule for Christians, why doesn’t its maxim apply to Scripture?

Note the maxim says “for credibility,” not “to prove true.” Falsification is negative—it can’t produce positive claims without violating logic. Since the Bible rejects observation, empiricism, and induction for knowledge, and falsification uses them, Christians don’t employ it for knowledge. Even using modus tollens—directly, in reductio ad absurdum, or falsification—is only negative, offering no positive truth. When someone says, “I don’t see God healing today,” it’s wrong not because of falsification but because Scripture rejects inductive observation outright.

There’s nothing wrong with modus tollens to show something is false—Scripture uses this deduction. St. Augustine and Paul (1 Corinthians 15) did too, free of empiricism or observation assumptions. But if someone uses empiricism as a standard, showing documented healings should convince them if they’re consistent. We can use modus tollens to refute them with their own flawed epistemology. The catch? Induction’s conclusions don’t logically follow premises, so they can reject evidence due to its inherent uncertainty. Even a deductive argument using observation—ours or theirs—becomes unsound, leaving conclusions skeptical. Induction offers no logical binding to accept any conclusion—you can dismiss or embrace as you please.

As a Christian, the Bible says God heals, and on faith’s demand, He will (John 15: Jesus predestined us to ask and receive). I expect healings. My observations are private knowledge—and if I applied these with deductions from Scripture “for myself,” then my self-knowledge is what the bible asserts. But shifting private to public knowledge violates logic’s laws. Scripture alone is our starting point for knowledge about healing. Anyone using inductive observations to argue miracle healing is a fool, rejecting the Bible as the sole epistemic foundation.[1] Such debates aren’t about healing but epistemology—Scripture’s deductive logic versus induction’s fallacy. Tell them they’ve abandoned Christian doctrine on knowledge and logic; if they don’t repent, boycott and excommunicate them.

The Scientific Process

Observation and Hypothesis Formation (Inductive Step)

Note: “Scientific experimentation (affirming the consequent)” has been pushed back to “hypothesis formation.”
Scientists observe phenomena in nature or data, noticing that when event A occurs, phenomenon B follows. This resembles affirming the consequent: “If A, then B; B happens, so A caused it.”

  • Example 1: (A) Rain occurs, (B) my yard gets wet. (B) I see my yard wet, so I hypothesize (A) it rained.
  • Example 2: (A) Bacteria add chemical X to solution H, (B) it turns red. (B) I see it red, so I hypothesize (A) bacteria added X.

Formulating the Hypothesis (Setting Up for Modus Ponens)

Initially, scientists observe B (a fallacy) to check their idea. If testing’s possible, they run preliminary affirming-the-consequent experiments for merit. Then, they frame hypotheses as modus ponens: “If A, then B; A, thus B.” They pretend a necessary connection exists to apply modus tollens later—not to affirm the consequent but to predict outcomes. They say, “If hypothesis (A) is true, under these conditions, we’ll see (B).”
In layman’s terms, this is logical voodoo, a void, or superstition.
Two ways this bait-and-switch happens:

  1. Vincent Cheung’s Example (A Gang of Pandas):
    1. “If (A) is a cause, then (B) is a result. B happens, thus A caused it.”
    1. Restated as modus ponens with B and A flipped, using a false conclusion to build an argument.
  2. Direct Pretence: Pretending inductive “If A, then B” is real or pretend it’s a necessary connection. This is like misstating a math problem to reflect reality. If I buy 4 apples at $1 each, calling it calculus is delusional if it doesn’t match reality. Scientists engage reality via affirming the consequent due to observation—they can’t avoid it. Restating it as modus ponens is delusional because it doesn’t mirror their actual interaction with phenomena.

Experimental Design (Testing via Modus Ponens)

Scientists design experiments controlling A to see if B follows, mimicking modus ponens:

  • If hypothesis A is true, under specific conditions, B occurs (If A, then B).
  • They ensure A is present.
  • They check if B happens (A leads to B).
    This isn’t just to affirm the hypothesis (a fallacy) but to test predictions under control. Yet, problems still abound:
  • The setup stems from a fallacy—using a false conclusion from observation and affirming the consequent to fake a connection. This restated logic doesn’t reflect their real-world engagement; it’s fabricated.
  • They only pretend it’s modus ponens—in name only. Some admit the connection is merely sufficient, making falsification tentative, not necessary, contradicting the very definition of logical inference.
  • Controlled tests can’t rule out infinite unknowns (e.g., heat affecting results unbeknownst to a scientist ignorant of it).
    Vincent Cheung notes, “The idea is simple. To know that any experiment is “constructed properly” the scientist’s knowledge must be “bigger” than the experiment. But if his knowledge is already “bigger” than the experiment, then he hardly needs to perform the experiment to gain knowledge that is limited by the experiment. The only way to be sure that one has identified and controlled all variables that may affect the experiment is to possess omniscience. The conclusion is that only God can tell us about the universe.”[2]

Falsification Attempts (Modus Tollens)

Here’s the shift:

  • If B doesn’t occur when A is present: “If A, then B; not B, therefore not A” (hypothesis falsified).
    Scientists aim to confirm hypotheses (affirming the consequent), but better ones seek disproof. Misaligned results falsify, and this leads to rethinking and refinement.
    Yet observation and affirming-the-consequent thinking build the argument for falsification. Induction underpins science’s foundation and definition. The “deductive” arguments are unsound—born from false conclusions, misrepresenting reality. It’s deduction by pretence. Before falsification, the hypothesis’s necessary connection is unknown. Falsification deems it wrong, which says little.
    The experimental connection has two interpretations:
  • If honest (connection is sufficient or a guess), falsification is uncertain, not necessary—violating deduction’s essence.
  • If claiming necessity, it’s pretence, falsifying only a pretend reality, breaching contradiction and identity laws.
  • Finally, saying “laws are formulated by falsification” is a non-sequitur. Negative propositions can’t yield positives without adding information—violating logic. Laws from falsification can only say “this isn’t that.” Positive laws from falsification defy logic; negative isn’t positive.

The point is that observation and affirming the consequent thinking and testing is involved in formulating the argument that will be tested by falsification. Thus, induction is both the foundation of science and therefore involved in the definition of science. The so-called deductive arguments are unsound, because they are created by false conclusions and the logic does not reflect their interaction with reality. It is deduction only by pretending. Before falsification is used, it is not known if the major premise of the syllogism (hypothesis) has a necessary connection. Falsification says this unsound argument is wrong. which is not really saying that much.

The connection in their experiment can be taken in two ways. If they are honest and admit the connection, at the very best is sufficient or a guess, then if falsification is used, the falsification is only a guess, but not a necessary falsification. This violates the very definition of deduction, which is necessary. If they insist the falsification is necessary, then they violate the laws of contradiction and identity. If they want to insist their connection in their experiment is necessary, then it is only by pretending. Thus, if they use falsification, it is only falsifying a pretend reality.

Lastly, there is the part where scientists say, “laws… are formulated by falsification.” This is false. It is a non-sequitur fallacy. Remember our rules for category syllogisms? We talked about distribution of terms but also the quality and quantity of a syllogism. If the propositions of an argument are negative, you cannot get a positive out of it. The same here.  Falsification can only say, this is wrong, but to then turn around and say we have a law that says, “this is this,” is to add more information than what the argument says. Laws, formulated by falsification can only say at best, “this is not that.” Every positive law stated by scientists using falsification is a violation of the laws of logic. To say negative is a positive is anti-logic.  

[1] This is different from starting with the truth given by scripture, and then present your healing as “testimony” that agrees with the truth. You are saying the bible is the proof, and my testimony agrees with the truth, not the other way around.

[2] Vincent Cheung. A Gang of Pandas. Sermonettes Vol.1.

Science is Anti-Logic

Recently, I have been reminded that people think science is deductive and logical.

Empiricism, Observation and affirming the consequent are logical fallacies.  Because they are the epistemology, order and systematic practice of science, it means science has no knowledge. Science has no body of knowledge.  These logical fallacies are built into the nature of empiricism and science. For example, because the bible is God’s revelation given to us, deduction is therefore pre-baked or built into our worldview. We do not discover or observe truth, God reveals it and we apply (i.e. deduction) this knowledge to us and the world around us. We do not formulate generalizations because God already gives us the truth up front.

If your epistemology starts with the five senses (which is a fallacy), then fallacies of induction are pre-baked or built into your worldview. No amount of crying about this, will make the fallacies go away. You do not have knowledge because it was not revealed and given to you. And so, you must observe and attempt to find it. You must use particulars (‘some’ (in addition to being private, transient descriptions)) and generalize (‘all’ category statement). However, to do this you violate the law of contradiction by saying ‘some’ and ‘all’ are the same thing. The only way to avoid this is if you are omniscient, or can observe all things in all past, present and future with perfect understanding of all you observe. Unless this is the case, then the premises of observation are always a ‘some.’ However, category statements need to be ‘all’ statements if you want knowledge about reality. All conclusions produced by induction do not logically follow from the premises. This means all induction is a non-sequitur fallacy. This means all induction is anti-logic, because it violates the law of contradiction and violates the law of valid inference. The logical void between premise and conclusion is the place where the laws of logic are violated. Induction is anti-logic.

The statement “trees are rocks” is primarily a category mistake because it misclassifies trees, which are living organisms, as rocks, which are inanimate objects. Trees and rocks belong to fundamentally different categories and have distinct properties. However, it can also be seen as a contradiction because trees and rocks have inherent, distinct properties. Trees grow and reproduce, while rocks do not. Therefore, saying that a tree is a rock contradicts the essential properties that define each category. The primary issue is the misclassification of categories, but it can also be seen as a contradiction due to the inherent properties of trees and rocks.

The inherent properties of knowledge are not material. However, sensations and reality are material. To have premises about material things to then conclude with knowledge, is primarily a category mistake, but also a contradiction because of the inherent properties of these categories. Thus, observation and empiricism are anti-logic.

Empiricism is a fallacy. What you see is not the same as the thing you are seeing; they are different categories. Also, the visual or audio sensation is not knowledge, but you understand what you are seeing by invisible propositions of true and false. Sensations are not propositions, and thus you have multiple category fallacies when you go from the thing itself, to sensation and then to knowledge. This results in a repeated systematic denying of the law of contradiction. To say the category of a “the thing itself,” a “sound” and a “proposition” is the same, is a category error and so it also denies the law of contradiction. Category errors in one’s epistemology would lead to skepticism, and this would also deny the law of contradiction. Empiricism is anti-logic.

Scientific experimentation is the fallacy of affirming the consequent. I want to give credit to Vincent Cheung for helping me understand this below, from his essay, A Gang of Pandas.

A. If chemical Y is present, then this solution will explode.
B. The solution exploded.
C. Thus, I verified that chemical Y is present.

This is a fallacy. Maby chemical ‘k’ was present and it was the reason for the explosion. We are on the topic of logic. Logically, controlled tests do not eliminate the infinite number of variables that could be affecting the experiment. Controlled tests have no bearing on removing the fallacy of affirming the consequent. The only way for a scientist to know if his controlled test does eliminate all other variables, is to already have more knowledge than his experiment, but if that is the case then he doesn’t need science anymore, because he already knows all things.

A scientist will then take the conclusion produced by the fallacy of affirming the consequent and then restate it as a Modus Ponens in their scientific journal. Scientist want to be deductive and logical so they restate their fallacy in a deductive form. However, the reformulation is in name only. Logic must match up with reality.  Affirming the consequent is experimentation.

D. If his solution explodes, then chemical Y is present.
E. This solution exploded.
F. Thus, chemical Y was present.

 Thus, to restate such statements as Modus Ponens in scientific publications is nothing less than a delusion. They state their experiments as category statements to be used in deduction.  This gives them the appearance that they have knowledge. However, the first premise of their Modus Ponens was produced by the fallacy of affirming the consequent. Thus, their deduction is unsound.  There never was a body of knowledge to begin with. But they want to have a body of knowledge and so they transform categories and necessary connections not present in their premises and illogically put in their conclusions. They are anti-logic. 

Using “deduction” without knowledge or with false premises means the syllogism is unsound. To use deduction without knowledge is delusional and insane. For example, for me to say, “All box-jellyfish are jellyfish. I am a box-jellyfish. Therefore, I am a jellyfish,” would be deductive but also delusional. It is vain to use deduction or logical inference, unless you have a body knowledge to begin with. Knowledge is something science never had. You cannot use the triple fallacy of empiricism, observation and affirming the consequent and then produce knowledge; it is logically impossible. It is anti-law-of-contradiction to say a conclusion that does not logically follow from the premises produces knowledge.  

Science: the Fallacy of an Undistributed Middle Term

QUEST. Is the fallacy of affirming the consequent a type of inductive reasoning; or is inductive a type of the fallacy of affirming the consequent; or are the two completely unrelated? Induction is defined as arguing from a particular to a universal.
Affirming the consequent: P ⊃ Q; Q; ∴ P.

ANS. Affirming the Consequent and inductive reasoning are similar or comparable, if we define inductive reasoning as “having more information in the conclusion than what the premises contain.”

In essence, the informal fallacy called, “non-sequitur” – “does not logically follow from the premises”—is what all inductive reasoning is.

Deduction: Conclusion has information only contained in the premises.

Induction: Conclusion has new additional information the premises do not contain.

For example

E1. All [things that comes to pass] are [determined by God]. B is C
E2. [Man’s moral acts] are [things which come to pass]. A is B
E3. Thus, [man’s moral acts] are [determined by God], & [not responsible]. A is C & D

The conclusion “man’s moral acts are determined by God,” is obviously already contained in the original premise, “All that comes to pass are determined by God.” If all things are determined by God, then so is man. Simple enough. However, the term “not responsible” and the necessary connection to it are not in the premises. This the essence of all inductive reasoning, it a non-sequitur.

As for affirming the consequent, depending on the terms and its simplicity many of them can be interchanged with categorical logic. Be forewarned not all can be interchanged like this.  It needs to be a simple,  If A then B is C. (Example, “If A is B, then C is D,” type of arguments will not work. 

The thing to remember is if one does truth tables in Natural Deduction, one will see that the simple forms (modus ponens, modus tollens) do not become invalid with complexity (for example with multiple conjunctions). Thus, the key is to master the basic forms, and realize they will continue to be valid, even in complexity, long as one keeps the form. Since scientific experimentation uses the form of affirming the consequent, and denies theory’s with a modus tollens, all one needs to do is understand these basics. Also, keep in mind, basic propositional logic like modus ponens, focus on the necessary connections, while basic category logic will focus on necessary category realities. If you have one, because these are “necessary,” then you have the other, but they are not the exact same thing. 

This simple modus ponens is stating the B and C terms, the third term, which is missing is an implied fill-in-the-black, ‘A’ subject.

If a mammal, then warm blooded. (B is C)
Is a mammal. ( B )
Thus, warm blooded. ( C )

The argument is based on the presupposition that mammals are warm-blooded (B is C) is a given truth.

M.1 If [Bats] are [mammals], then they [warm-blooded].  A, (B is C)
M.2. [Bats] are [mammals]. A is B
M.3. Thus, they [Warm-blooded]. A is C.

Even though the first line of this Modus Ponens, M.1., has all three terms (A is B is C), the main emphasis is that B is C, like the major premise of a Category Syllogism. Next, M.2. is A is B, which is similar to the minor premise of a Category Syllogism. Finally, the conclusion is A is C.

B is C
A is B
Thus, A is C.

This Modus Ponens is hypothetical in form only. The essence of this argument is the comprehension and extension of the terms, not mainly about the necessary connection from B to C. Thus, we will put this into a bullseye syllogism.

N.1. All [Mammals] are [Warm-blooded]. B is C.
N.2. All [Bats] are [Mammals]. A is B
N.3. Thus, All [Bats] are [Warm-blooded]. A is C.

Now, let us review Affirming the Consequent, which is the structure for scientific experimentation. We will use a simple enough form that it can be used in categorial logic.

H.1. If [Jack] eats [lots of bread], then his [belly gets full]. A, (B is C)
H.2. [Jack’s] [belly got full].  A is C
H.3. Thus, [Jack] ate [lots of bread] A is B

B is C
A is C
Thus A is B.

This of course is a fallacy. It could be that Jack ate lots of durian rather than bread. Let us put this into categorical logic to see the fallacy.

Y.1. All [who eat lots of bread] are [those who belly’s get full]. B is C
Y.2. All [Jack] is [he who belly got full]. A is C
Y.3. Thus, [Jack] is [He who ate lots of bread]. Thus, A is B

If you noticed, the information in the conclusion has more than what the premises provide. This is the fallacy of an undistributed middle term. The picture below will help show a visual of this logical fallacy.

Thus, the fallacy of scientific experimentation, if restated in a category fallacy, is the fallacy of an undistributed middle term.